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OPINION OF THE COURT
______
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
The government brings this appeal challenging the
District Court‟s ruling that a prior conviction for wearing
body armor while committing a felony in violation of 11 Del.
C. § 1449(a) is not a predicate offense under the Armed
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Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We
hold that the body armor conviction is an ACCA predicate
offense because it involved the possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. It is “a serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1). We will vacate the ruling of the District Court
and remand for sentencing in conformity with this opinion.
I.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a felon
to possess a firearm. A person convicted under this section is
subject to a fifteen-year sentence-enhancement provision:
(1) In the case of a person who violates section
922(g) of this title and has three previous
convictions by any court referred to in section
922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a
serious drug offense, or both, committed on
occasions different from one another, such
person shall be fined under this title and
imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant
a probationary sentence to, such person with
respect to the conviction under section 922(g).
(2) As used in this subsection-(A) the term “serious drug offense”
means--
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(i) an offense under the
Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act
(21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter
705 of title 46, for which a
maximum term of imprisonment
of ten years or more is prescribed
by law; or
(ii) an offense under State law,
involving
manufacturing,
distributing, or possessing with
intent
to
manufacture
or
distribute, a controlled substance
(as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 802)), for which a
maximum term of imprisonment
of ten years or more is prescribed
by law;
(B) the term “violent felony” means any
crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year, or any act of
juvenile delinquency involving the use or
carrying of a firearm, knife, or
destructive device that would be
punishable by imprisonment for such
term if committed by an adult, that--
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(i) has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the
person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or
extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to
another; . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
Leonard Gibbs was arrested for violating the
conditions of his probation. In the course of arrest, the police
discovered a loaded .357 caliber revolver with ammunition.
He was charged with two counts: knowing possession of a
firearm and knowing possession of ammunition after having
been previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Gibbs pled guilty to the
firearm count pursuant to a plea agreement, which stated that
“[t]he maximum penalties for this offense are 10 years [of]
imprisonment” and that the government agreed to move to
dismiss the ammunition count. The District Court accepted
Gibbs‟ guilty plea.
After the guilty plea but before Gibbs‟ sentencing, the
government changed its position. The government explained
that, after reviewing the pleadings from Gibbs‟ previous
convictions, it concluded that Gibbs had three prior felonies
meeting the requirements for an enhancement under the
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ACCA. By the government‟s count, the three § 924(e)
“violent felony or a serious drug offense” convictions
included a 2003 conviction for “aggravated menacing,” a
2004 conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine,
and a 2007 conviction in Delaware state court for wearing
body armor while committing a felony. There was no dispute
that the first two convictions are ACCA predicate offenses,
but the government changed its position with respect to the
2007 conviction.
The government argued that wearing body armor while
committing a felony was a serious drug offense under
§ 924(e) because the underlying felony was possession with
intent to distribute cocaine. After Gibbs‟ guilty plea but
before the sentencing hearing, the government informed
Gibbs in a letter of its revised position. No longer did the
government subscribe to its view in the plea agreement that
“[t]he maximum penalties for this offense are 10 years [of]
imprisonment.” As a result, the government stated, it would
not oppose a motion by Gibbs to withdraw his guilty plea
before sentencing. But if Gibbs wished to proceed, the
government would argue for the imposition of an enhanced
sentence under the ACCA. Gibbs decided to proceed to
sentencing, where he would argue that the body armor
conviction was not an ACCA predicate offense.
At the sentencing hearing, the government argued that
the District Court must take a closer look at Gibbs‟ 2007
conviction. The indictment charged him with two counts.
The first stated that Gibbs “did knowingly wear body armor
during the commission of a felony, Possession with Intent to
Deliver Cocaine, as set forth in Count II of this indictment
6

which is incorporated herein by reference.” (App. at 28.)
Count II charged that Gibbs “did knowingly and unlawfully
possess Cocaine . . . with the intent to deliver same,” in
violation of 16 Del. C. § 4751. (Id. at 28-29.) Gibbs pled
guilty to the first count but not the second. In doing so, he
engaged in the following colloquy:
The Court: You are charged that on or about the
21st day of October 2006, in the County of New
Castle, State of Delaware, you did knowingly
wear body armor during the commission of a
felony, the felony being Possession with Intent
to Deliver Cocaine, in violation of Title 11 of
the Delaware Code. Do you understand the
crime as I‟ve read it to you?
The Defendant: Yes, ma‟am.
The Court: And how do you plead?
The Defendant: Guilty.
(Id. at 51-52.) The government argued that, though Gibbs
was not convicted of the drug charge, the body armor
conviction was a serious drug offense.
After considering the government‟s changed position,
the probation office released a revised presentence report
concluding that Gibbs was not subject to an ACCA
enhancement. The government objected, and the District

7

Court ruled in Gibbs‟ favor.1 The Court stated that it could
only look to the text of the statute and the fact of conviction.
The Delaware body armor statute proscribes a person from
“wear[ing] body armor during the commission of a felony.”
11 Del. C. § 1449. The statute does not limit the underlying
“felony” to drug-related felonies.
The District Court
concluded that “the substantive content of [Delaware‟s body
armor statute] does not qualify it as a serious drug crime
under the ACCA,” (app. at 71) and held that Gibbs was not
subject to the § 924(e) enhancement. The Court sentenced
Gibbs to 72 months‟ imprisonment, and the government
timely appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We review the District Court‟s
denial of the ACCA enhancement de novo because the
government‟s appeal raises a pure question of law. United
States v. Henton, 374 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 690-91 (3d Cir. 2003).
III.
The government appeals the District Court‟s ruling
that Gibbs‟ state body armor conviction is not an ACCA
1

Gibbs objected that an ACCA enhancement was
inconsistent with the terms of the plea agreement. The
District Court did not rule on this objection because it held
that the enhancement did not apply.
8

predicate offense. We start with the text of the ACCA. A
state conviction qualifies as “a serious drug offense” if it is an
offense “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing
with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled
substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term
of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.”
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). There is no dispute that Gibbs‟
body armor conviction carried a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more, see 11 Del. C. §§ 1449
and 4205(b)(2) (carrying a statutory maximum of 25 years
imprisonment). The issue is whether the body armor
conviction “involv[ed]” manufacturing, distributing, or
possessing, with intent to manufacture or distribute, a
controlled substance.
Congress‟s use of the term “involving” expands the
meaning of a serious drug offense beyond the simple offenses
of manufacturing, distributing, and possessing a controlled
substance. See, e.g., United States v. James, 834 F.2d 92, 93
(4th Cir. 1987) (stating that “violations „involving‟ the
distribution, manufacture, or importation of controlled
substances must be read as including more than merely
crimes of distribution, manufacturing, and importation
themselves”). The plain meaning of “involve” is “to relate
closely” or to “connect closely.” United States v. McKenney,
450 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Webster‟s Third New
International Dictionary 1191 (1993) and The American
Heritage Dictionary 921 (4th ed. 2000), respectively). The
definition of a serious drug offense should be construed to
extend “§ 924(e) beyond the precise offenses of distributing,
9

manufacturing, or possessing, and as encompassing as well
offenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.”
United States v. King, 325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). In
adopting this position, we conform with all courts of appeals
that have addressed the scope of the definition of a serious
drug offense. See United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 365
(5th Cir. 2008); McKenney, 450 F.3d at 42; United States v.
Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2003); King, 325
F.3d at 113; United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186, 191 (4th
Cir. 2001).
Gibbs argues that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), defining the state
offenses that are serious drug crimes, should be interpreted in
light of § 924(e)(2)(A)(i), defining the federal offenses that
are serious drug crimes. Section 924(e)(2)(A)(i) defines
serious federal drug offenses by reference to three statutes:
the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.; the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 951 et seq.; and the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act,
46 U.S.C. § 7501-70508. Gibbs argues that the definition of
state serious drug offenses should be limited to the types of
crimes identified by the three federal statutes. In other words,
Gibbs argues that subsection (ii) cannot include a broader
range of offenses than subsection (i).
While both subsections relate to the same subject,
there is no reason to think that subsection (i) should limit our
construction of subsection (ii). If Congress wished to do this,
it could have done so. In the federal “three strikes” law, 18
U.S.C. § 3559(c), Congress limited the definition of serious
state drug crimes by defining it as, “an offense under State
law that, had the offense been prosecuted in a court of the
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United States, would have been punishable under section
401(b)(1)(A) or 408 of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 848) or section 1010(b)(1)(A) of the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C.
960(b)(1)(A)).” 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(H)(ii). Congress
explicitly limited the serious state drug offenses to the serious
federal drug offenses. The ACCA did not take this approach.
Instead, Congress used broad terminology – “involving” – to
define the category of serious state drug offenses without
limiting its scope to federal statutes. This means that
Congress did not wish subsection (ii) to be limited to the
same set of crimes listed in subsection (i).
Congress adopted a broad interpretation of “a serious
drug offense” because it intended to define an “entire class of
state offenses „involving‟ certain activities, namely,
„manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to
manufacture or distribute‟ a controlled substance.”
Alexander, 331 F.3d at 131 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)). Congress did not point to specific
statutes as it did in defining serious federal drug crimes by
enumerating “the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801
et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21
U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(i). Each state has different serious drug
crimes and different definitions for similar crimes. Thus,
Congress relied upon general language referencing the entire
class of serious state drug offenses.
Congress used the term “involving” to carve the class
of serious state drug crimes broadly. But there are of course
limits to how wide we can construe this class. As the First
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Circuit noted, “[n]ot all offenses bearing any sort of
relationship with drug manufacturing, distribution, or
possession with intent to manufacture or distribute will
qualify as predicate offenses under ACCA. The relationship
must not be too remote or tangential.” McKenney, 450 F.3d
at 45. We must therefore determine whether Gibbs‟ body
armor conviction is related to or connected with
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing, with intent to
manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance or if it is too
remote or tangential.
Of critical importance is what approach we take to this
question. The District Court held that it could only examine
the Delaware statute and the fact of conviction, thereby
precluding an examination of the underlying indictment and
plea colloquy. The government argues that we should adopt
an approach that allows us to look to the underlying
indictment and plea colloquy. The former approach has been
termed the “formal categorical approach” and the latter the
“modified categorical approach.” Before we proceed, we
must determine which approach is applicable in this case.
The ACCA generally requires that the sentencing court
look only to the fact of conviction and not to the facts
underlying the conviction. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575, 600 (1990). “Under the categorical approach, we must
look only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and
may not consider other evidence concerning the defendant‟s
prior crimes, including, the particular facts underlying a
conviction.” Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir.
2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This
interpretation derives from the language of § 924(e), which
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refers only to “a person who . . . has three previous
convictions,” not to “a person who has committed[ ]three
previous violent felonies or drug offenses.” Taylor, 495 U.S.
at 600 (emphasis added). The ACCA “most likely refers to
the elements of the statute of conviction, not to the facts of
each defendant‟s conduct.” Id.
Such a reading of the ACCA makes sense. Congress
wished to avoid an approach allowing an examination of the
underlying facts that “could force sentencing courts to hold
mini-trials, hear evidence and witnesses and otherwise engage
in a detailed examination of specific facts involved in the
prior offense.” United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 86 n.3
(3d Cir. 1990). “If Congress had meant to adopt an approach
that would require the sentencing court to engage in an
elaborate factfinding process regarding the defendant‟s prior
offenses, surely this would have been mentioned somewhere
in the legislative history.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601. At the
same time, there are occasions where a court must look
beyond the mere fact of conviction and the statute at issue.
For instance, “[s]tatutes phrased in the disjunctive may invite
inquiry into the record of conviction if it is unclear from the
face of the statute whether the conviction [is a qualifying
offense].” Garcia, 462 F.3d at 292.
In recognition of the need to look beyond the mere fact
of conviction in some cases, the Supreme Court developed
the modified categorical approach to allow sentencing courts
to look at the indictment or information and the jury
instructions. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. The approach was
adopted in the context of determining whether a state burglary
conviction constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA.
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The simple fact of conviction may not provide enough
information to determine whether a state burglary conviction
is a predicate ACCA offense. Thus, the Court adopted a
modified categorical approach for the “narrow range of cases
where a jury was actually required to find all the elements of
generic burglary.” Id. These cases invite departure to
determine which elements the jury had to find to convict
someone of burglary.
For example, in a State whose burglary statutes
include entry of an automobile as well as a
building, if the indictment or information and
jury instructions show that the defendant was
charged only with a burglary of a building, and
that jury necessarily had to find an entry of a
building to convict, then the Government
should be allowed to use the conviction for
enhancement.
Id.
The modified categorical approach is not limited to
prior violent felonies but also applies to determine whether a
prior conviction was a serious drug offense. See Vickers, 540
F.3d at 364; Brandon, 247 F.3d at 188. In other words, the
modified categorical approach applies broadly in the context
of § 924(e). See United States v. Bregnard, 951 F.2d 457,
459 (1st Cir. 1991). Where a statute‟s language is ambiguous
or disjunctive and, as a result, violation of the statute may and
may not constitute an ACCA predicate offense, then the court
may look to the indictment or jury instructions to determine
which elements had to be proven to support a conviction. See
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Shephard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20 (2005) (stating
that a court can look to the charging documents and “recorded
judicial acts,” like jury instructions, under the modified
categorical approach). The modified categorical approach is
limited to this “narrow range of cases.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at
602. In Brandon, the Fourth Circuit stated,
[The modified categorical approach] applies in
cases where the state statute can be violated in
several different ways, some of which would
support enhancement under 924(e) and some of
which would not. In those cases, the sentencing
court may examine the indictment, other
charging papers, or jury instructions to
determine whether the defendant was charged
with a crime that meets the requirements of
section 924(e).
247 F.3d at 188. It is appropriate for us to apply the modified
categorical approach in this case if the statute of conviction is
ambiguous or disjunctive, thereby inviting inquiry into
whether the conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense
pursuant to § 924(e).
The Delaware body armor statute “can be violated in
several different ways.” Id. The statute merely proscribes a
person from wearing body armor “during the commission of a
felony,” 11 Del. C. § 1449, but it leaves the underlying felony
undefined. This use of the word “felony” incorporates by
reference the disjunctive list of all felonies. We cannot
determine from the face of the statute alone whether a
violation is an ACCA predicate offense but must look to the
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underlying facts of the conviction to determine if it is a
violent felony or a serious drug offense. If the underlying
felony was burglary, a violation of the body armor statute
may constitute a violent felony. Likewise, if the underlying
felony was manufacturing, distributing, or possessing a
controlled substance, this may constitute a serious drug
offense. In order to determine whether the body armor
conviction is an ACCA predicate offense, one must look to
the charging instrument or jury instructions. Applying the
modified categorical approach in this context does not entail
an “elaborate factfinding process regarding the defendant‟s
prior offenses,” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601, and it does not
“force sentencing courts to hold mini-trials.” Preston, 910
F.2d at 86 n.3. All the approach requires is a determination of
what the underlying felony was that the defendant committed
while wearing body armor. Just as one must examine the
indictment and jury instructions to determine if a state
burglary conviction is an ACCA predicate offense, one must
examine the indictment to determine if Gibbs‟ body armor
conviction is an ACCA predicate offense. As such, the
modified categorical approach should be applied in this case.
Under the modified categorical approach, we examine
the indictment to find that the body armor charge states that
Gibbs “did knowingly wear body armor during the
commission of a felony, Possession with Intent to Deliver
Cocaine, as set forth in Count II of this indictment which is
incorporated herein by reference.” (App. at 28.) We must
determine whether Gibbs‟ offense as stated in the indictment
meets the ACCA‟s definition of a serious drug offense. The
question then becomes whether wearing body armor while
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committing a felony, where that felony is possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, is related to or connected
with “manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to
manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), or if it is too remote or tangential.
To determine whether a conviction is related to or
connected with the particular conduct of manufacturing,
distributing, or possessing a controlled substance, “courts
follow the approach outlined in Taylor and ask whether the
proscribed conduct is an inherent part or result of the generic
crime of conviction . . . or, stated somewhat differently,
whether the abstract crime intrinsically involves the
proscribed conduct.” Brandon, 247 F.3d at 191. Here, we
must examine whether manufacturing, distributing, or
possessing, with intent to manufacture or possess, a
controlled substance is “an inherent part or result of the
generic crime” of wearing body armor while committing a
felony, where that felony is possession with intent to
distribute cocaine. Id. We find that it is both.
First, the underlying felony is an inherent part of the
offense of wearing body armor while committing a felony
because the underlying felony must be proven in order to be
guilty of the body armor offense. While it is true that the
defendant need not be convicted of a drug offense, a person
convicted under 11 Del. C. § 1449 has to be found guilty of
some underlying felony. And where, as in this case, the
felony is a drug crime, proof of the elements of a drug offense
is required. See Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575, 581 (Del.
2005) (construing an analogous statute proscribing
“possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony”).
17

In pleading guilty to the body armor offense, Gibbs pled
guilty to the elements of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine. Second, wearing body armor serves to promote and
advance the underlying drug crime. The underlying felony is
a result or effect of the proscribed conduct because wearing
body armor makes it more likely that a felony will occur.
Where the underlying felony is a drug crime, wearing body
armor while committing a felony serves to promote and
advance the drug crime. This establishes that a serious drug
offense “is inherent in the generic conduct proscribed by the
statute and alleged in the indictment underlying” Gibbs‟
conviction. Id. at 191-92. We, therefore, conclude that
Gibbs‟ body armor conviction is a serious drug offense under
the ACCA.
Gibbs argues that this interpretation of “a serious drug
offense” raises a constitutional problem of fair notice. But
our case law holds that a statute “violates due process of law
if it „either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of ordinary intelligence must necessarily
guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.‟”
United States v. Woods, 915 F.2d 854, 862 (3d Cir. 1990)
(quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926)). The ACCA does not “forbid[] or require[] the doing
of an act.” It is a sentencing law and does not proscribe any
conduct. See United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 331 (3d
Cir. 2000) (“The ACCA is a sentence enhancement statute
and does not create a separate offense.”). Regardless,
interpreting “serious drug offense[s]” to include the Delaware
body armor conviction is hardly vague. Gibbs‟ offense was
wearing body armor while possessing with intent to distribute
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a controlled substance. It is not so vague or unexpected and
does not betray fair notice to find that such an offense
“involv[es] manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with
intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.”
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
IV.
We hold that Gibbs‟ body armor conviction is an
ACCA predicate offense. The government argues that we
need not remand to the District Court for a determination of
whether the ACCA enhancement is in conformity with the
terms of Gibbs‟ plea agreement. We disagree and believe
there are material issues of fact that the District Court must
resolve. For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and
remand to the District Court to rule on Gibbs‟ outstanding
objection to the ACCA enhancement.
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